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THE PROBLEMS OF THE LEASED LINE
JOHN F. MECr, JR.*
The part played by the leased line in railroad reorganizations prior to those of
the present day seems to have be6 rather inconspicuous. In those earlier reorganiza-
tions, railroads, on the whole, were still in an era of expansion. While serious lease
problems occasionally arose, they were generally capable of being solved without too
much difficulty and without undue hardship to cither lessor or lessee. Today, how-
ever, the.pictlire has been altered. Changes in transportation which have affected all
railroads adversely have accentuated leased line problems. There are more problems
than formerly and, in addition, they seem to be more serious. At the same time care
must be taken not to overemphasize the difficulties, of leased lines. A majority of
those whose lessees are undergoing reorganization have given rise to but few issues.
Some, however, because of unusual circumstances in their particular instances, involve
perplexing problems. It is this somewhat "pathological" type of case with which we
are principally concerned in this brief survey of leased line problems.1
Lease rentals are an important part of the fixed charges of many railroads.2 Dur-
ing solvency of the lessee there is no way, save with the lessor's cosent, of reducing
the amount of rent. But in reorganizatior this obligation may be drastically modified
or even wiped out completely by reason of the power in the lessee's trustees to reject
leases 3 It is a powerful weapon and it is its exercise that creates the more acute
problems.
In any study of the leased line it must be borne in mind that the variations in
railroad leases are tremendous. Almost every lease differs, in some slight detail at
least, from every other lease. Nevertheless, certain general similarities do exist, not
only in lease instruments themselves, but also in the origin and development of
various lessors. From these some generalizations can be drawn which are helpful in
providing a background for understanding the status of the leased line in reorganiza-
tion of its lessee.
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The lease device appeared on the scene shortly after the building of the first
American railroads. Its use soon became widespread as a convenient means of com-
bining two or more independently operated railroads. While a majority of leases in
existence today were entered into prior to xgoo, the lease has continued to be used up
to the present.
Aside from a few unusual variations, most railroad leases follow in form the
pattern of the real property lease. The lessor transfers to the lessee the use of its
property for a term of years. In some instances this term may be as short as one year,
but it is more likely to be 99 years, or even 999 years, and often it is expressly made
perpetual. 6 Ordinarily everything the lessor owns goes over "lock, stock and barrel"
to the lessee for the duration of the lease. In return the lessee agrees to pay a stip-
ulated rental, generally to the lessor company, although it is not unusual for its
promise to run directly to the lessors security holders.7 The lessee also always
promises to maintain the leased property and to return the road to the lessor upon
termination of the lease in a certain specified condition.
It is extremely difcult to ascertain precisely what was in the minds of the parties
making the lease as of the date of its execution. in some situations, however, it seems
that the parties clearly intended nothing more than an ordinary landlord-tenant rela-
tionship. In others they seem to have merely been using the lease form to achieve
ali.the consequences of a transfer of actual ownership of the leased line to the lessee.8
This impression is strengthened in many cases by the course of events since that
time.*
Regardless of the terms of a particular lease instrument and the original intent
of the parties, practically all leased lines have had similar histories after the lease has
been executed. Generally the lessor company has become an almost dormant entity10
Its property has been merged into the lessee's system and is indistinguishable from
the rest of th'- lessee's property. Not infrequently the lessor's entire capital stock hi's
been acquired by the lessee. Sometimes *a large proportion of its bonded debt has
been similarly acquired. But whether the lessor is independently controlled or not,
in the majority of cases there is little likelihood of it ever again becoming an operating
company.1
* In some instances the lease hai been a mere device to facilitate financing extensions and branches of
existing roads. Such a lessor never operated its own line.
'From the dose of the Ci'il War through 1937 there have been only six years in which at least one
lease still in existence has not been executed. The active periods of lease-making were x868-i87a, 1887-
x896, and x921-i93o. 'See Meek & Masten, supra note x, at 632.
' This type of promise is ordinarily referred to as a "guaranty" and ;n some leases is stamped on the
face of the lessors securities.
* Some leases may be leases in name only. One factor indicating that the parties intended something
approximating a total t-ansfer is the glaring inadequacy in some leases for what happens at the expiration
of their terms. Ordinarily no schedules of rolling stock and equipment are included in the lease instru-
ment itself, and occasionally it seems they never existed anywhere.
* Particularly by the great number of instances where the lessee has become the sole owner of the
lessors capital stock.
'0 See Meek & Masten, supra note 1, at 636-638; BLAcx, Tim LrrrLE Mtume RuLito (1940) 189.
" In earlier eras of reorganization lessors often had been dormant only for a relatively brief period
and they were able to resume operation. Today, when this period of inactivity has been much longer, the
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It is with this brief background that we turn to the status of the leased line in
the reorganization of its lessee. As pointed out above, the most significant problems
arise upon rejection of the lease by the lessee's trustees. Their power to reject leases,
together with their concomitant power to adopt, has long been established in equity
receivership practice and its existence under Section 77 has never been questioned.1 2
The term "rejection," however, is somewhat a misnomer and requires some explana-
tion. It is fundamental that the lessee's trustees do not become obligated upon a
lease by reason of their appointment. Such an obligation, binding upon the lessees
estate for the duration of the reorganization, can be created by their electing to adopt
the lease. But the situation with respect to rejection is quite different. No rejection
can occur in a logical sense for, having no liability, there is nothing to reject. What
really occurs is an election "not to adopt," whereby the lessee's trustees simply affirm
the continuance of a state of nonliability.P8
The lessee's trustees may reject (or adopt) a lease at any time after the reorganiza-
tion has begun. They are said to have a reasonable time in which to reach a decision.
Occasionally they will act immediately, but more often nothing will happen for at
least six months. 4 In some instances no action whatever will be taken during the
entire proceeding.15 But where they do act and reject a lease, one can be reasonably
certain that problems will shortly arise. In the main these problems are three,
although the third may also arise irrespective of any rejection during the proceeding
by the trustees:
(x) Who operates and who bears the financial risk of operation upon rejection
of a lease?
(2) 'What claims does.the lessor have as a consequence of such. rejection?
(3) How will the leased line be dealt with in the ultimate plan of reorganization
of the lessee?
chief obstacle to a resumption of operation is the lessor's lack of funds. If the lessor's security.holders were
willing to supply the funds it is possible that operation might be resumed in some cases without great
difficulty.
2The import of subsections (a) and (c) (2) of Section 77 is clearly that this power exists under the
statute. The equity cases include United States Trust Co. v. Wabash Western Ry., 150 U. S. 287 (1893);
Quincy, M. & P. R. R. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82 (1892); St. Joseph & St. L R. R. v. Humphreys, 345
U. S. 105 (1892); Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313 (1892). See Clark, Foley & Shaw, ddop-
tion and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by Receivers (1933) 46 HAxv. L. Rzv. ixix.
1 The phrases "elect to adopt" and "elect not to adopt" probably characterize most accurately the
action which the trustees may take with respect io leases. In this article "rejection" is used hi the sense
of "election not to adopt."
"' Where a lease obviously is burdensome, rejection may take place promptly. See New Haven Pro-
ceeding, Order No. 23 (D. Conn. Dec. 14, 1935) Ct. Rec. p. 193 (rejection within two months). Mare
likely, however, the first period of six months, given the trustees to rach a decision by the initial order,
will be extended from time to time. Often both the lessee and lessor interests are anxious to avoid the
taking of any decisive action.
"The eventual result in such instances in equity was that the old lease would be assumed by the
reorganized lessee. This same outcome may be anticipated under 577.
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THE OPERATION OF ThE LEASES LIN
The lessees trustees, by rejecting a lease, disclaim any further interest in that
leased line for the lessee's estate. But this does not mean they have no duty to operate
that line. Operation must be maintained by someone, at least so long as it is not at
so great a loss as to be confiscatory.'4
This situation is largely taken care of by Section 77(c) (6), which provides in
substance that the duty to operate is on the lessor unless the judge finds it im-
practicable and contrary to the public interest for the lessor to operate. In the event
of such a finding, and it is invariably made, the lessee or its trustees must continue
operation until some disposition is made of the leased line, whether by complete
physical abandonment or otherwise.17 As a practical matter in almost every instance
of rejection the lessee's trustees have had to continue operation.
The financial risk of this operation must then be ascertained. Is it to be borne
by the lessor or by the lessee's estate? Subsection (c) (6) expressly provides that after
rejection operation shall be for the lessor's account-in other words, at the lessor's
risk. There is also the period between the commencement of the lessee's reorganiza-
tion and the date of rejection. Here, too, by the preponderance of authority, operation
is deemed to be for the Iessor's account.'8
Placing the risk of operation upon the lessor has certain important results. The
lessor is not entitled to the rental stipulated in the lease for any of the time after the
lessee goes into reorganization. Instead it gets the net earnings, if any, of the leased
line. If there are no net earnings, and operation is at a loss, the lessor becomes liable
to the lessee's trustees for the amount of that loss. These amounts of profit or loss
are administrative items and entitled to all the priorities accorded that class of
claims. °2 This fact becomes particularly significant in the case of a loss, for it is
charged against the lessor's property as a lien thereon prior to the lien of all mort-
gages. Operation for the lessor's account, therefore, may have rather serious con-
sequences.2
2'see Meek, supra note x, at 1403; c. Warren v. Palmer, 6o Sup. Ct. 865, 867 (1940); Webster and
Atlas Nat. Bank v. Palmer, xxt F. (2d) 215, 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Erie PR R. Reorg., Interim Rep.
of Special Master (N. D. Ohio, Feb. 2, 1940) Ct. Rec. p. 2189.
SlThe implication in at least one recent decision that physical abandonment of the leased line is the
sole means by which the lessee or its trustees can get-rid of this duty to operate is not accurate. See
Webster and Atlas Nat. Bank v. Palmer, supra note 16, at aS. A lessor which cannot resume operation
immediately may be able to do so at some later date, whereupon the lessee's duty woulct cease. The reor-
ganized lessee itself might, at some later date, enter into a new lease or some other arrangement with the
lessor. Subsection (c)(6) merely offers a temporary solution of the problem.
"
5See Meek, supra note I, at 1401, where the problem of accounting for operation is discussed in
detail and the authorities are collected. In a giVen situation "special equities" may be present which will
afford a basis for a different result, but to date no such case has arisen under S77. See Pennsylvania Steel
Co. v. New York City Ry., 198 Fed. 721, 73o n. (C. C. A. 2d, i9x2).
"Palmer v. Palmer, 104 F. (2d) x61 (C. C. A. ad, 1939), cert. den. 6o Sup. Ct. 1o, 121 (1939).
" Palmer v. Palmer, supra note xg; cf. Palmer v. Warren, so8 F. (ad) 164 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940),
6fld, Go Sup. Ct. 865 (1940) (jurisdicti onal point only). See also Meck, supra note 1, at 1419.
The amount of these prior charges may become so great that the lessee's estate may become the
owner of the lessor's property and nothing will be left for the lessor's security holders.
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The problem of determining whether a profit or loss exists in operation of a
leased line lies within the jurisdiction of the court administering the lessee's reor-
ganization. As an incident of its possession of the leased line, it has been held to be
the proper court not only to fix the state of accounts between the lessor and the
lessee's trustees, but also, in the event of a loss, to impose a prior lien therefor upon
the lessor's property 22 The normal procedure is for the lessee's trustees to render a
report of the results of their operation to the court. An opportunity is given for all
parties concerned to file objections, and, after a hearing, the court confirms, revises
or otherwise disposes of the report2 3 Such a report may raise several types of
problems, but the principal dispute has been over the role of the segregation of earn-
ings formula. Here especially the circumstances of the individual case may be of
prime importance2 4
A further problem may come up in the rare case where a lessor, upon failure of
the lessee's trustees to pay the stipulated rental, seeks to retake and operate its own
leased line. Immediately the question arises of how long the court administering
the lessee's reorganization may restrain the lessor from exercising its right of reentry
without complying with the rent provisions of the lease. It seems dear that the'
lessor may be held off for a reasonable time and in all .probability this 'easonable
time may be considerably shorter than in other instances where the lessor is unable
to operate. In other words, the fact ihat the-lesso" wishes to reenter may force the
lessee's trustees to an earlier decision than otherwise.2 5 If the court should permit
them to have an unduly long time, operation may be held to have been for the
account and at the risk of the lessee's estate for the portion which is deemed in
excess of a reasonable time.2
Ctios onH LEsso. AGcAsT Tm L
Rejection of a lease by the lessee's trustees gives the lessor or, under some cir-
cumstances, its security holders, certain claims against the lessee's estate for breach
of the lessees covenants. Most important of these is the covenant to pay rent for the
duration of the lease, breach of which gives rise to the claim for so-called future
rent.2
Rent covenants differ materially from lease to lease, but the most usual type is a
"Warren v. Palmer, qo Sup. Cr. 865 (1940).
2 See, e.g., New York, N. H. & H.L R. . Reorg., Revised Rep. of Administration of Property of Hart-
ford & C. W. R. R. for x938 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 1940) CL. Rec. p. 6415.
" See, e.g., id., Objections of Trustees of Boston & Prov. R. R. (D. Conn., March ii, x939, and March
a8, 1940) CL Rec. pp. 5459, 6677. See also Palmer v. Warren, 1o8 F. (2d) x64 (C. C. A- ad, 1940),
with which compare Blaine v. Cheston, I1o F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
"'Even lessors which are unable to operate their own properties are probably entitled to force the
lessee's trustees to act with respect to their leases. Usually, however, they are reluctant to force this
decision. See North Kansas City Bridge & K. Co. v. Leness, 82 F. (2d) 9, 13 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); 4.
In re Chase Commissary Corp, 11 F. Supp. 288 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
"Cf. United States Trust Co. v. Wabash Western Ry., 150 U. S. 287, 309 (1893).
Other important covenants are the lessees promise to maintain the leased property and to return
it to the lessor at the end of the lease.
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promise running directly to the lessor company.2s Claims arising upon breach of
this kind of a covenant have had a checkered career in railroad reorganization, In
equity receiverships rent was viewed in the light of its feudal antecedents as issuing
from the land and as coming due only when the period for which it was reserved
had passed. As a result claims for rent were allowed only to the extent of damages
actually suffered up to the final date for filing clains.F9
The hardship on the lessor of this rule in equity has been alleviated by Section 77.
Under the statute the definition of the term "creditor" includes the holder of a claim
under an unexpired lease and it further provides that the amount of such a claim
shall be determined "in accordance with principles obtaining in equity proceed-
ings. '3' Because of the rather vague language in the statute this alteration in the
measure of damages was not immediately effective. A Supreme Court decision, how-
ever, accomplished the contemplated change by construing the proper measure under
the statute to be the difference between the present value of the rent reserved for
the balance of the term of the lease and the present re-rental value of the leased
property for that same period of time.'
Despite the establishment of this more favorable construction to the lessor, its
troubles are far from over. Application of this measure of damages is obviously a
difficult one because of the long periods of years or even centuries which many
leases have to run before the date of their expiration. In the cases to date somewhat
paradoxical results have ensued. Two cases will serve to illustrate the problem. In
one the lease was of a street railway system for 999 years, of which 969 years re-
mained at the date the lessee entered reorganization 3 There was, of course, no
problem in ascertaining the present value of the rent reserved for the 969 remaining
yearsP3 But violent controversy developed over determining the re-rental value. In
the trial court the entire claim was disallowed, even for damages accrued to the date
of the trial. Holding that the claim must be considered upon the basis of the 969
years and no other, the court ruled that it was impossible to say with any reasonable
certainty what the re-rtntal value was for the balance'of the term and that the failure
of the lessor to establish such value was fatal to its entire claim. 4 On appeal a more
58
sWhere the promise runs directly to the lessors security holders, see p. 5x5, infra.
t :Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603 (s9x8). Provability of future rent claims has given rise
to a large body of legal literature. Douglas & Frank, Landlords' Claims in Reorganizations (1933) 42
YaLE I. J. 1003; Clark, Foley & Shaw, mupra note i; Schwabacher & Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bank-
ruptcy (1933) 33 COL. L . a3; Jacobson, Landlords' Claims under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act
(1936) 45 YALE L J. 42
"* §77(b). Under former 577B and present Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, dealing with reorganiz-
tion of corporations generally, difficulty was avoided by limiting the amount of the claim to the rent for
three years. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 1 zU. S. C. A. 56o2 (1939) (Chapter X, 52o2).
"
t Connecticut Ry. & Ltg. Co. v. Palmer. 305 U. S. 493 (1939).
"Connecticut Ry. & Ltg. Co. v. Palmer, to9 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). 'This case involved
issues arising out of application of the measure of damages laid down by the Supreme Court in the ease in
note 31, .rUpra.
" See New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg, Memo. of Decision on Claim of Connecticut Ry. cc Ltg.
Co. (D. Conn., June 2, 1939) Ct. Rec. pp. 5815, 5818.
" The court refused to hold that inability to prove any re-rental value entitled the lessor to the prcnt
value of rent reserved for the balance of the tur
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lenient point of view prevailed as to the certainty with which damages -had to be
proved. Disregarding the 969 remaining years, the court treated the lease "as if it
were for a term of fairly definite forecast."35 This period was held to be eight years
from the date of the trial, and adding the damages already accrued for three years
preceding the trial, the lessor came out with a future rent claim for eleven years
in aL36
The second case involved a lease of only 99 years, of which 57 years were un-
expired at the date the lessee entered reorganization.8 7 Again the present value of
the rent for the balance of the term involved only a mathematical calculation. But
as to the re-rental value, the lessor demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that the
leased line had no such value whatever. The court, therefore, applied the measure
of damages set forth above, and the lessor's claim was allowed in full for the present
value of the rent reserved for the unexpired portion of the term.38
Considered separately," perhaps each of the foregoing decisions is reasonable.
Taken together, however, they indicate the intricacy of the problems of future rent
claims. It appears that the longer the lease the greater will be the difficulties of proof.
Lessors with 99-year leases seem in a stronger position so far as proof of such claims
is concerned than lessor with perpetual or 999 year leases. Yet, when a 999 year lease
was executed, presumably the longer term was a consequence of greater bargaining
strength of the lessor involved, and so the better a bargain the lessor drove, the worse
off it may be today. Of course, where a leased line has some value, the lessor will
have that value in addition to whatever it proves against the lessee's estate.3 9
All covenants to pay rent do not run to the lessor itself. In some leases the
promise is to pay directly to the lessor's shareholders a fixed annual dividend on their
shares, and to the lessor's bondholders, if any, the interest on their bonds. These
securities are commonly referred to as "guaranteed." 40 Such a covenant may be
construed in some cases as a direct promise to the lessor's security holders, entitling
them, as third party beneficiaries, to look directly to the lessee for payment. When
these parties attempt to prove claims in the lessees reorganization, the variety of
provisions and circumstances indicate that particularly knotty problems may be
presentedx
" See Connecticut Ry. & Ltg. Co. v. Palmer, supra note 32, at 571.
"The amount of the claim allowed was $4Ax1,837.61.
3T New York, N. H. & H. Rt. R. Reorg., Memo. of Decision on Claims of Old Colony I. R. (D. Conn.,
Nov. 25, 1939) Ct. Rec. p. 6257.
lThe amount of the claim allowed was $39,339,i6i.
"In any case of a rejected lease the leased line will at least have some salvage value. Often it will
also have some value as a going concern, especially when unprofitable segments of line or types of business
can be abandoned. In one case it has been proposed to stop passenger service on a leased line and continue
operating it as a freight line only. Erie R. R. Reorg., Answer of Underwriters Trust Co. (N. D. Ohio,
Jan. 27, 1940) Ct. Rec. pp. a181, 2186.
" This terminology is applied whether or not the "guaranty" is actually stamped on the lessors
securities.
' Both bonds and stocks may be involved. In the case of the former, the "guarahty" may be of
interest and principal, although it is most likely to be of interest only. These bonds may have a maturity
date long prior to the expiration of the lease. Then too, there is the question of what effect is to be given
to the fact that the security of the mortgage on the leased line may still be available to the bondholders
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Two other of the lessees covenants also may cause some trouble. They are the
covenant to maintain the leased line during the term of the lease and the covenant
to return it at the end of the lease in a certain specified condition. Claims for dam-
ages for breach of these covenants accrue in full upon disaffirmance of the lease.
There is no question of their provability under Section 77 and the only issue is the
amount of damages which can be established. Again the outcome depends to a large
extent upon the language of the particular covenants in question and the evidence
of injury which the lessor is able to produce. Up to the present time the tendency
seems to be to set up a fairly strict standard of proof for lessors.4 2
After all these claims for breach of the lease have been passed upon, and allowance
made for any counterclaims the lessee may have, the final amount will be fixed. This
amount almost always will be a general unsecured creditor's claim on a parity with
all other such claims.
THE LFssoR iN THE LmEs's PLAN op REORGANIZATION
The consummation of a plan is the ultimate objective in any reorganization. The
formulation of this plan commences almost with the proceeding itself and progresses
simultaneously with the matters heretofore discussed."
Where the lessee's plan of reorganization provides for assumption of the original
lease by the reorganized lessee, whether or not it has been previously adopted by the
trustees, no problems of importance arise. But acute problems are presented where
the lease has been rejected or the plan calls for some disposition of the leased line
other than by adoption of the lease. 4 The plan in theory must deal with the lessor
in at least two capacities: as an unsecured creditor and as owner of the leased line.
In the former capacity the lessor will receive the same treatment as other unsecured
creditors. In the latter, however, the lessor will be treated in accordance with the
value of the line to the lessee. In one instance it may be desirable to retain the leased
line as part of the reorganized lessee's system; in another it may be preferable from
the lessees point of view to cut the leased line from its system. None of the proceed-
ings under Section 77 involving leased lines has reached the stage of final consum-
mation. However, sufficient progress has been made to indicate the problems
involved.
Where retention of a leased line has been decided upon, several possible methods
are available. One is to provide in the plan for a modified lease, whereby the leased
line is kept part of the system under a lease which in all probability will have a
" Cf. New York, N. H. & H. . R. Reorg., Memo. of Decision on Claims of Boston & Prov. R. .
(D. Conn., Dec. a6, x939) Ct. RetC. pp. 63339, 6344-6355; id., Memo. of Decision on Claim of Hartford
CW. R . F.. (D. Conn., June 28, x939) Ct. Rec. p. 5857.
"'Only one plan, of course, will eventually be put into force. During the proceeding there may be
several plans proposed by the debtor and by various groups of security holders.
"' Where a leased line is of great value to the lessee, it may, nevertheless, be retained by some means
other than a lease. Under S77(b) it is possible to reject in the plan a leasc which has previously been
adopted by the trustees.
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lower rental and a shorter duration.4 5 A second method of retention is through
merger or consolidation, for which Section 77 specifically provides.' 6 Different con-
sequences, however, ensue than those which follow upon retention under the original
or a modified lease. Upon merger or consolidation the lessor company automatically
ceases to exist, and its line and other property becomes the property of the reorganized
lessee. Its security holders exchange their securities for those of the lessee in accord.
ance with the arrangements made in the plan.47
If retention of the leased line is not deemed desirable, no provision whatever will
be made in the lessees plan. If the lease has not already been rejected by the lessees
trustees, it may be rejected in the plan and the future of the leased line will be left
for determination by other means.48 Conceivably this might mean subsequent re-
sumption of operation by the lessor company. Perhaps some other railway system
may be interested in acquiring the leased line. More likely, however, since failure
to provide for the leased line in the lessee's plan is indicative of unfavorable operating
results, application will be made to the I. C. C. for permission to abandon the leased
line completely. 49
The leased line situation-involves one very practical problem with respect to
carrying out the lessee's plan of reorganization. It is simple enough to provide in the
plan for a modified lease, merger or consolidation, or some other arrangement, but
there may be some difficulty in binding the lessor and its security holders to those
provisions. At least three different situations may arise.
(i) One situation is where the lessee owns a majority of the lessor's capital stock.
If the lease has been rejected it is likely that the lessor itself will also have to go into
reorganization. Section 77 permits such a lessor to file its petition in the lessees pro-
ceeding as a subsidiary debtor. ° If the leased line is to be retained, a single plan
will be formulated for both lessee and lessor.5' This plan, if approved by the I. C. C.
and the court, can be made binding upon the lessor's security holders upon ac-
ceptance by two thirds of each class. This joint reorganization facilitates the retention
of the leased line, particularly in overcoming difficulties under state laws.P2
"9If the lessor company is also in reorganization, material danges may take place in its capital struc-
ture. Even if it is not in reorganization, its security holders may be offered and may be willing to accept
less in the way of dividends and interest. 'r77(b).
'The two methods suggested are by no means the only ones available. Still another method would
be an acquisition of the leased line by way of purchase in return for securities of the reorganized lesse.
"Cf. Chicago, R. 1. & P.-Ry. Reorg., Petition for and Order No. 174 (N. D. 111, March 15, 1940)
(C. Ree- pp. 2971, 2977 (abandonment of operation by the lessee's trustees of the White and Black River
Valley Ry.). Where operating losses are so great as to be confiscatory, it may be that no . Q C. permission
is necessary in order to abandon. " S77(a).
" Where the leased line is not to be re-ained the lessee's plan will make no provision for it. In such
a case the court, unless it is possible to reorganize the lessor separately, would probably dismiss the pro-
ceedings as to the lessor. Thereafter, several alternatives remain, one of which is liquidation of the lessor.
a. Under S77(f), upon confirmation the plan may be carried out, "the laws of any State or the decision
or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding." This provision would have particular
significance in overriding state merger and consolidation statutes, the appraisal provisions of which might
create real difficulties.
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(2) The situation is materially different if the lessee does not own a majority of
the lessor's stock and the lessor itself is not in reorganization. Upon rejection of the
lease, although the leased line remains in the custody of the lessee's trustees, it is not
part of the lessee's estate and security holders having interests in it cannot be bound
in the lessees reorganization. Consequently, if the lessee's plan provides for a
modified lease or merger or consolidation, such a provision is little more than an
offer to the lessor. Acceptance of this offer will be determined, not by submitting the
lessee's plan to the lessor's security holders, pursuant to Section 77, but according to
the law of the state where the lessor is incorporated. So far as shareholders are con-
cerned appraisal statutes may create difficulties. If bondholders are affected, little
short of unanimous consent to any changes may become essential. There is no way
in which dissenters can be bound.r
(3) A third situation is where, although the lessee does not own a majority of the
lessor's capital stock, rejection of the lease forces the lessor into a reorganization of
its own. If the territorial jurisdictional requirements can be satisfied, this proceeding
may take place in the same court in which the lessee's proceeding is pending, but
the two proceedings would be separate. In other cases this will not be possible and
the lessor's reorganization may take place in a different district court in a different
circuit.
If the two reorganizations are in the same court it may be possible to work out
related plans for the lessee and lessor. Upon acceptance and confirmation in the
separate proceedings, dissenters may be bound. Here also it will be possible to over-
ride any state laws. Even where different courts are involved, this same procedure
is possible, although as a practical matter it will be considerably more difficult.54
CoNCLUSION
In the brief compass of this article it has been possible only to point out some of
the major problems which have arisen in connection with leased lines. The process
of solving them is still in an intermediate stage and the ultimate outcome is not
wholly clear. As reorganizations of lessee railroads progress the practice is becoming
more and more settled, and, as disputes are resolved in one proceeding, precedents
will be afforded for others. While statutory amendments might obviate some of the
issues, the final solution is not that simple. On the whole the problems of leased
lines are part of the problems of the entire railroad industry. While the lease device,
to some extent, has served to accentuate these problems and to create a few additional
ones, the future of leased lines cannot be charted separately from that of all railroads.
S The dilemma in this type of situation is well illustrated in the Chicago, M., St. P. & P. reorganiza-
tion, although a case of rejection was not involved. The lessor Terre Haute was not in rcorganization,
despite the fact that the lessee owned 97% of its stock. To carry out the lessee's plan it was essential to
reduce the interest rate on the lessors bonds. In its report on the plan the I. C. C. indicated that prac.
tically unanimous consent of the lessors bondholders was necessary. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. Reorg.,
Fin. Doc. No. 1o882, (Feb. 12, 1940) mimeo. rep. at 77-85.
"' Sectional differences and local pride occasionally may interfere with cooperation between two district
courts.
